As a result of the absence of a unified policy for interaction between Russian military planners, Russian military intelligence, the command of "Wagner" and leaders in Mali, operations struggled due to the lack of leadership. The defeat of the private Russian military group "Wagner" in Tinzauitine, in the northeast of Mali, revealed problems in management and control after the transfer of the operations of "Wagner", led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, to the Defense Ministry, and also raised questions about the future of the Tartus port and its vital aviation base in Hmeimim after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December. All this occurred against the backdrop of the third year of the brutal war in Ukraine. Some analysts have begun to believe that Russia's influence and ability to deploy its power in the Sahel region are starting to wane, or the Kremlin is beginning to prioritize African Sahel and other friendly African countries as a priority. In Russia, there are military, political, and expert voices that tend to downplay Moscow's diminishing presence in the region. Some use Africa as a bargaining chip in possible negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. In meetings with officials, experts, private military companies, and representatives of Russian authorities, the retreat from the Sahel region and from Africa in general currently seems small. Despite the recognition of the importance of traditional values and the failure of liberalism, cooperation with the Trump administration in Africa remains small. Critics of Russian experts and military on the direct involvement of armed formations in the indirect conflict began with the start of the campaign in Mali. **Citation:** "We can all see how the world inexorably moves toward a new dictatorship. Perhaps that is the country we are heading to. But our journey is filled with total enjoyment." - Alexander Chub, political scientist. Initiatives of the authorities and private individuals aimed at creating some-commercial organizations and public alliances that use anti-Western rhetoric and discredit Western interference in the Sahel region will be launched. In this environment, "Wagner", although they showcase some degree of independence, but to a much lesser extent than the leaders of the group in the CAR. Nonetheless, the group is, presumably, embroiled in a conflict and is associated with military structures in Mali. After the death of the leader of the "Wagner" group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, its subdivisions were redistributed inside Russia between security forces or sent to Belarus, however, the situation with the subdivisions in Africa was more complicated, and replacing or reforming the "Wagner" subdivisions was impossible because the formation of quality and well-coordinated subdivisions requires time. The battle of Russia in Ukraine has devastated the fighters of "Wagner", as well as experienced fighters of the group in Africa. The group began to position itself as a military solution for complex conflicts. In the CAR, the operation "Wagner" was in significant part a private initiative, however, with the emergence of the group in Mali in early 2022 there is a necessity for an interdisciplinary analytical center, capable of evaluating the descending crises in the Sahel region, has become evident. With the beginning of the campaign in Mali, Russian experts and some officers have critically examined the direct involvement of Russian armed forces in the indirect conflict. Continued presence of "Wagner" subdivisions in the battles, which took place in the most complex and bloody areas, and which sometimes acted practically independently of the Malian army, led to a decline in military security of the troops. The defeat of "Wagner" in Tinzauitine, where about 100 fighters of the group were killed, confirmed these trends. It is planned that Russia will invest in "soft power" initiatives, surpassing military preparation. Russia's backing for the export of security to Africa after the successful contract of the "Wagner" subdivisions against armed groups in the CAR in 2021 became a strong impetus. After a noted increase over the past two years in the Sahel region, 2024 may bring a series of failures in Russian military operations.
